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COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER
FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX t

Upon reflection, few will deny that industrial society, in its consolidating phase, demands for its own security and stability the presence
of standards of public regulation and of auxiliary social services essentially uniform throughout the economy.- Viewed realistically, therefore, the contemporary trend toward a nationally integrated framework
of administrative effort is both inevitable and welcome. 2 Yet it is no
less true that the weight of immediate operational responsibility must
rest in the local area. As an industrial commonwealth, we shall soon
be forced to come to grips with this problem.
So much is clear: there are two practical approaches toward solution. On the one hand, federal or state administration may decentralize
authority to a sufficient degree to give their field apparatus full opportunity for displaying constructive initiative in adapting general rules
to local needs. 3 On the other hand, the central organization, state as
well as federal, may stimulate and utilize responsive implementation of
over-all policy through the activities of local government. How widely
we have been able to rely on such cooperation is attested by the conspicuous rise of intergovernmental relationships. 4 But even where no
formal cooperative bonds exist, it is altogether obvious that in the day
of the "service state" 5 municipal authorities must play an increasingly
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active role in promoting the welfare of their citizens. Hence, it is not
surprising that the scope of their police power and the technical alternatives available for its exercise are acquiring a new prominence in
the current flow of judicial decisions.
In this entire sphere, however, local bodies confront peculiar uncertainties with regard to the legal limitations which courts might
impose upon them. Just as in England one can observe a noticeable
retrogression from the judicial liberality of the Arlidge case 6 to those
strictures of hostile construction which have adversely affected the
development of public housing,7 so have American courts since the
turn of the century gravitated in the direction of more exacting
scrutiny of municipal undertakings. True enough, the traditional doctrine emphasizing creative freedom in the choice of means within the
scope of existing power has never been abandoned,8 but actual adjudication of concrete issues often veered far away from it, especially
when property rights were involved, as they usually are.
The difficulties thus arising for the exercise of the municipal
police power were not minimized by the fact that the judicial reaction
to individual cases appeared to lack broader consistency one way or
the other.' On the contrary, the sole result was an elimination of the
mental comfort of predictability. More specifically, when local authorities left the choice of the means in the enforcement of policy to their
administrative agencies or officers, they could not be sure that the
courts would endorse so much discretion. Conversely, when the means
was explicitly designated in an ordinance, litigation might lead to an
invalidation of the ordinance itself, on the ground that another means
would accomplish equally well the desired end.
The present paper is intended as a comment on the ensuing
dilemma, a dilemma particularly aggravating at a time in which a
premium is being put on municipal inventiveness. The method shall
again 10 be that of the comparative approach turned toward "situational" case analysis.
6. Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A. C. 120.
7. See Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English
Housing Legislation (1936) 49 HAgv.L. REv. 426.
8. i McQuLLiN, MuNIcIPAL C0o'ORaTIoNs (Rev. 2d ed. 194o) § 390.
9.The range of variations is vell illustrated on the one extreme by Bohn v. Salt
Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P. (2d) 591 (1932), 8o U. oF PA. L. REv. 1167, and on the
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and therefore not reviewable by certiorari, although petitioner was given a hearing.
IO.Cf.Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of
Discretion (1939) 87 U. oF PA. -L.REv. 954; Comparative Administrative Law:
Economic Improvisation by Public Authorities (1940)
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The municipal legislature of the city of New Orleans passed an
ordinance 11 making it an offense to wreck, dismantle or store for
commercial purposes any motor-driven vehicle or junk on the sidewalks, streets and other public places, and to store for sale such or
similar materials on open lots not fenced in as described in the
ordinance. The prescribed specifications required an enclosure "all
around on all boundary lines" made of a "proper, suitable and substantial fence not less than seven (7) feet nor more than ten (IO) feet
high." The fence was required to be "kept in a constant state of good
repair." A subsequent ordinance 12 amended the specifications by demanding a "substantial feather-edged board fence not less than seven
(7) I" x i2/" 'Nominal Size' feather-edged boards high, nailed horizontally across 4" x 6" 'Nominal Size' wood posts on 8'-o" centers
and set three feet into the ground."
On the basis of these provisions, the city took action against a
company operating an auto-wrecking and scrap-material yard at a
street corner in one of the industrial districts. The president and
general manager of the company was prosecuted in the First Recorder's
Court of the City of New Orleans, the affidavit charging that the yard
was not fenced off in the proper manner. A demurrer and a motion
to quash the affidavit on the dual ground that the ordinance was unconii.

"Ordinance 14194, Commission Council Series .

So.

523, 524 (i939).

.

. reads as follows, omitting

Section 3, which prescribes the penalty for violating the ordinance, and Section 4,
which provides that each day after the conviction a violation shall constitute a separate
offense:
"An ordinance to prevent the wrecking or the dismantling or storage for commercial purposes of any motor-driven vehicle or junk on the sidewalks, public streets
and other public places, and/or to prevent the storing for sale of the wreckage or parts
of any motor-driven vehicles; also, any iron or steel junk or rags on any open lot or
parcel of ground not fenced in as described in Section 2 of this Ordinance, and to fix
penalties for failure to comply with the provisions and requirements of this Ordinance.
"Whereas, it is necessary in the interest of public safety and comfort that the
sidewalks, streets and other places be kept from any obstruction that might make
same"Whereas,
unsafe, and
the operation of many automobiles [sic] and other junk yards encroach
on the sidewalks without any line of demarkation for property lines by fence or otherwise much to the inconvenience of the public good and welfare.
"Section i. Be it ordained by the commission council of the city of New Orleans,
that from and after the passage of this Ordinance it shall be unlawful for any person,
firm or corporation to wreck, dismantle or store for commercial purposes any motordriven vehicle, automobile, auto truck or iron or steel junk or rags on the public sidewalks, public streets and other public places.
"Section 2. Be it further ordained, etc., that no person, firm or corporation shall
be permited to store or offer for sale any iron or steel junk, rags or wreck or wreckage of motor-driven vehicles or automobiles and/or auto truck or any open lot or
parcel of ground that is not properly inclosed all around on all boundary lines with a
proper, suitable.and substantial fence not less than seven (7) feet nor more than ten
(io) feet high, and further that the said fence must be kept in a constant state of
good repair." City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 899,
192

Ordinance 14283, Commission Council Series. It confined itself to amending § 2
of the earlier ordinance (see note ii suprq) by providing for the more detailed
specification quoted in the text.
12.
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stitutional and an illegal exercise of the police power were overruled
by the judge. Against the conviction of its responsible officer, defendant company appealed successfully to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana.' 3
The appellate court formulated the legal issue as follows: "The
question presented is whether the ordinance is constitutional. If it is,
defendant is guilty, for it is admitted that the fence now surrounding
the yard, where the scrap material, and possibly other junk, is stored,
is not built according to the specifications set out in Section 2 of the
ordinance as amended." 14 In other respects, however, the existing
fence was in good condition and not in need of repair. Evidence had
been presented at the trial to show that the auto-wrecking and scrapmaterial yard in question "is enclosed on all sides by a substantial
mesh-wire fence, described as a 'steel Page cyclone fence,' seven feet
high, topped with three strands of barbed wire, built at considerable
expense. It was proved-in fact, it is admitted-that this fence adequately serves the purpose of preventing any material stored on the
yard from encroaching upon the sidewalks or public ways; that it protects those who may use the public ways from injury or damage by
coming in contact with the material stored on the yard; that those who
use the sidewalks and public ways are as safe in such use as if no
material of any kind were stored on the yard. It was proved that a
strip seven feet wide along the fence on all sides was left, on which no
material whatever was stored. The purpose of leaving this vacant
space apparently was to prevent any of the material from protruding
onto the sidewalk." 15 In fact, even the police officer in charge of this
case had conceded as a witness that the present fence did keep all stored
materials from obstructing free passage on the street. 1 6
Nor was the trial judge unaware of the actual circumstances. He
summed up the evidence as demonstrating that "all of the junk, autos
and wreckage is in an open wire fence enclosure and does not encroach
on the sidewalk or street .

.

. the junk, autos and wreckage is kept

seven (7) feet from the said wire fence surrounding the described
junk yard." 17 Nevertheless, it was also true that the "open wire
fence .

3

.

. does not comply with the City Ordinance which requires

City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895,

93 ).

192

So. 523

14. Id. at 9OI, 192 So. at 525.
15. Id. at 9oi-9o2, 192 So. at 525.
16. "Q. Isn't true that the metal fence which presently surrounds this area
suffices to keep in all the automobile wreckage or scrap iron from encroaching on the
sidewalk or street or public ways? A. That is true." Id. at 9o2, 192 So. at 525.
Defendant's president and general manager was asked a similar question: "Q.
Does this fence serve to keep the public side walk, streets and other public places in the
vicinity of your yard free from any obstruction that may make them unsafe? Yes." Ibid.
i7.Id. at 9o3, 192 So. at 525.
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a seven (7) foot tight board fence around such wrecking and junk
yards . ..." 18

He added that defendant company "could easily

comply with the law by erecting a legal fence within the wire fence...
or

. .

.could comply otherwise or discontinue business if . . . [it] sees

necessary." 19 This consequence served as the pivot in the appellate decision. The court said, "under the judge's ruling, the defendant . ..,
although the company has erected an expensive fence which protects
those who use the public ways from all danger, must, under the penalty
of fine or imprisonment, either build a fence that conforms to the letter
with the specifications in Section 2 of the ordinance, as amended, or
cease business. Therefore, if the ordinance is unconstitutional, defendant will be deprived of his liberty and his property without due process
of law." 20 From this vantage point, the court inquired into the legal
foundation of the contested measure.
Under the laws of Louisiana, 21 the state has delegated to the city
of New Orleans all those powers, privileges and functions which are
constitutionally conferred upon other municipalities, and specifically
the authority "to exercise full police power." Could it be claimed that
the controversial provision represented a proper exercise of the expressly granted police power? The court prefaced its answer with a
sharper delineation of the dispute before it: "Counsel for the city
argue that the adoption of the ordinance was a reasonable and constitutional exercise of the city's police power. It is not disputed by
counsel for defendant that the city may, in the exercise of its police
power, regulate and control the occupation of dealing in junk. It was
held by this court in Shreveport v. Schultz, 154 La. 899, 98 So. 411,
that, if the public health, welfare, or safety requires it, junk stores may
be excluded from prescribed limits of a municipality, but that such a
regulation must be reasonable. The same rule would necessarily apply
to junk yards such as this defendant operates. Whether the City of
New Orleans may legally require that junk yards adjacent to sidewalks
or streets be fenced in, is not the point at issue. That is conceded by
defendant. The defense here is that, in view of the declared purpose
i8. Ibid. As to the legal basis, the trial judge observed that "it is within police
powers to enforce said Ordinances under the Constitution of the State of Louisiana,
and of the United States." Id. at goi, 192 So. at 525. The state constitution provides
that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of
law."

LA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2.

ig. City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 903, 192 So.
523, 525 (1939).
2o. Ibid. Leaving no stone unturned, defendant had amplified this conclusion at
the trial by arguing that "the ordinance, and particularly Section 2 thereof as amended,

is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable" as well as
"discriminatory, and its adoption was an unauthorized, unwarranted, and illegal exercise of the city's police power." Id. at goi, 192 So. at 525.
21. 4 LA. GEN. STAT.AN. (Dart, i939) § 6175 (d).
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of the ordinance under attack, the requirements of Section 2 of the
ordinance, relating to the kind of fence which operators of junk yards
must erect around their yards, is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power, because the requirement of a tight board fence
instead of a substantial fence built of other material in no way tends
toward the accomplishment of the object for which the city's power
was exercised in this case." 22 Thus the court arrived at a differentiation between end and means, between the objective of the regulation
and the method of attaining it.
Proceeding from established legal principle, 23 the court first
focused its attention upon the end of the regulation. It satisfied itself
that the municipal authorities, on this score, had not transcended the
bounds of the law: "The ordinance has a lawful purpose, and the city
was authorized under its police power to prescribe reasonable means
to accomplish that purpose. The ordinance is a safety measure pure
and simple. According to its clear and express language, it has but one
purpose, which is to keep the sidewalks and public ways adjacent to
junk yards free from rubbish or obstructions, so that such public ways
may be safe passages for those who use them." 24 The problem, then,
reduced itself to the legality of the means adopted by the city council.
Section 2 of the ordinance, in its amended form, defined the means, as
we saw earlier, in considerable detail, without allowing for modifications or departures. In the words of the court, "These specifications
are inflexible. The planks must be 'feather-edged' and twelve inches
wide, and must be nailed to posts 'horizontally'. Fourteen six-inch
'feather-edged' planks, nailed horizontally, would not suffice, although
they would suffice to build the fence seven feet high. Nor would a
tight plank fence made of twelve-inch 'feather-edged' planks suffice if
the planks stood upright, or perpendicular to the ground. Nor would
a solid stone, brick, or cement wall seven feet high, built on all sides of
a junk yard, meet the requirements of the ordinance. The ordinance
22. City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 904, 192 So.
523, 525-526 (1939).
23. The court quoted the "general rule which prevails here and elsewhere" as
follows: "In order that a municipal regulation be sustained as an exercise of the
police power, the regulation must have for its object the prevention of some offense
,or manifest evil or the preservation of the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. The exercise of the police power must have a substantial basis. The power
cannot be made a mere pretext for legislation that does not fall within it. There must
be some clear, real, and substantial connection between the assumed purpose of the
regulation and the active provisions thereof, and the provisions must in some plain,
appreciable, and appropriate manner tend toward the accomplishment of the object
for which the power is exercised." 43 C. J. § 228 at 227. Finding "this general statement of law . . . supported by many decisions," federal as well as state, the court
declared it unnecessary to review them. City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto
Wreckers, i93 La. 895, 904-905, 192 So. 523, 526 (1939).
24. Ibid. The court substantiated this conclusion by considering the content of the
preamble of the ordinance and the declaration of purpose embodied in it. See note ii

supra.
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calls for a 'feather-edged' board fence." 25 It plainly left no room for
the recognition of any other method of achieving the end which the
city council had in mind. There was but a single avenue of compliance.
While the court could not well proclaim the means itself inappropriate, it refused to sanction the exclusiveness of the legal prescription: "The declared purpose of the ordinance being to make the sidewalks and public ways safe for pedestrians, there is no reason why a
tight or solid wall fence of any particular kind should be required when
a substantial fence of another kind, built of different material, serves
the same purpose, as is the case here. The provisions of the ordinance,
requiring that junk yards be inclosed with board fences and with no
other kind, do not tend in any appreciable or appropriate manner
toward the accomplishment of the object or purpose for which the
city's police power was exercised. This requirement is purely arbitrary
and unreasonable." 26 Hence, to insist upon the requirement would
virtually result in a destruction of defendant's property 27 without warrant in law. 2 8 "The means adopted to attain the purpose sought to
be accomplished by a municipality, under its police power, must be
reasonable." 29 That there might be some justification for distinguishing between the means proper and the stipulation that it alone be used
apparently escaped judicial attention.
The court raised only one further question, namely, whether defendant's enterprise, in view of its character, might call for stricter
standards than would apply to others. But the question proved rhetorical: "Dealing in junk is a legitimate and harmless business. Junk
yards are not necessarily nuisances. They do not affect the public
25. City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 906-9o7, 192
So. 523, 526 (1939).
26. Id. at 907, 192 So. at 527.

27. As the court put it, "Defendant's property is enclosed by an expensive, substantial fence, which serves the purpose and intent of the ordinance. If, in order to
escape punishment and remain in business, defendant must build another fence in
literal compliance with the ordinance as written, his present fence will be worthless.
It will, in effect at least, be destroyed for no purpose whatever." Ibid.
28. In the language of the court, "While the police power of municipalities is
broad and far-reaching, it is not without limitations. In the exercise of that power,
municipalities may go to the boundaries of reason but no further. The exercise of
that power must have a substantial basis. On proper occasion and for adequate reasons, the power may be exercised to limit the use of private property, or even to
destroy it. But the exercise of that power for such purposes, without adequate reasons, is a violation to the Due Process Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions."
Id. at 9o8, 192 So. at 527.
29. Ibid. Referring to 43 C. J. §§ 227, 229-230, at 226, 228, 230, and to 6 R. C. L.
§§ 194, 208, at 197, 213, the court added, "Municipal police power may not be exercised to infringe arbitrarily or unreasonably upon personal or private property rights."
City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 908, 192 So. 523, 527
(1939). For further support, the court specifically quoted 6 R. C. L. § 227, at 237, to
the effect that "there must be obvious and real connection between the actual provisions of a police regulation and its avowed purpose, and the regulation adopted must
be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained." It also referred
to 6 R. C. L. § 228, at 239.
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health, nor do they offend against public morals. Individuals have
the constitutional right to use their private property for junk yards as
long as such use does not offend public morals or jeopardize the health
and safety of the public." 3o Dismissing other points of argument at
the bar as irrelevant,3 1 the court reached its closing line by pronouncing
"that portion of Section 2 of Ordinance 14194, as amended by Ordinance 14283, Commission Council Series, of the City of New Orleans,
which requires junk yards of the character specified in the ordinance to
be enclosed on all sides with a fence built according to the specification
therein contained, is unconstitutional; the conviction and sentence of
the defendant are set aside, and it is ordered that he be released." 82
In short, to specify a means, even though it be appropriate in itself, to
the exclusion of any other means conceivably equally appropriate,
invalidates the regulation.
The decision invites several observations touching upon both legal
construction and administrative practice. In the first place, it puts in
bold relief the tendency toward greater judicial stringency with regard
to the municipal police power at a time when the latter is bound to
draw wider circles. One may fruitfully compare the outcome of the
present decision with the solution achieved in an earlier case in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court faced an identical situation. 3 A local
ordinance, imposing certain sanitary standards for the use of stables,
contained specific provisions as to the required mode of laying the
stable floor, without allowance for alternatives. The court took a more
sympathetic view of the regulation: "The ordinance stands as a protection to those who conform to it. If the owner secures the sanitary
condition of his building by adopting some other plan, he is not
amenable to prosecution. In departing from the directions contained
in the ordinance, he takes the risk of creating a nuisance. If the plan
30. City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, go8-9o9 192
So. 523, 527 (I939). Concerning the "right of individuals to use their private property

as they see fit, as long as their use of it is not offensive or dangerous," the court

quoted ii Am. JIm.§ 279, at 1037: "Nevertheless, the owner has the right to erect
such structures or to use the property for such legitimate purpose as he may see fit,
utilizing such portions of it as he pleases, as long as in so doing he in no manner
injuriously affects the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Any law
abridging rights to a use of property, which use does not infringe the rights of others,
or limiting the use of property beyond what is necessary to provide for the welfare
and general security of the public is not a valid exercise of the police power."
31. City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, i93 La. 895, 909, 192 So.
523, 527 (I939). "There was considerable discussion at the bar relating to the question as to whether the city, under its police power, may restrict the use of private
property for junk yards to designated areas of the city, and whether the city may, under
its police power, limit or restrict the use of private property for aesthetic reasons.
This discussion and the decisions cited which touch these points have no application
here, for the reason that the ordinance is a safety measure." Ibid.
32. Id. at gog-gio, I92 So. at 527.
33. Morford v. Board of Health of Asbury Park, 61 N. J. L. 386, 39 Atl. 7o6 (Sup.
Ct. 1897).
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he resorts to is a failure he may be held for the penalty, not on the
ground that he has not conformed to the plan specifically set out in the
ordinance, but on allegation and proof that his stable is a nuisance." 34
Accordingly, instead of invalidating the regulation, the court held, "not
that the ordinance is void, but that the owner is not restricted to the
manner of laying the floor which is prescribed by the ordinance." 3Nevertheless, he would be responsible for the inadequacy of any other
means of his own choosing. The framework of the regulation thus
survived.
In one respect, however, there is little difference between earlier
and current decisions: in the critical attitude which courts tend to display toward a specification of the means by administrative authorities.
Even in a day when the judicial mind was less eager to examine the
degree of necessity and propriety, a New York court declared: "And
it seems that whoever, in abating an alleged nuisance, injures private
property, or interferes with private rights, whether he be a public
officer or private person, save when he acts under the judgment or order
of a court having jurisdiction, acts at his peril, and this principle is
applicable to boards of health." 3 This point of view is qualified only
by greater judicial reluctance toward interfering with the technical
operation of vital public safety functions 3 7 or with individual acts of
the representative organs of local government themselves.38 On the
34. Id. at 391, 39 Atl. at 708.
35. Ibid. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not consider this ingenious accommodation at all.
36. Eckhardt v. City of Buffalo, ig App. Div. I, 14-15, 46 N. Y. Supp. 204, 213
(4th Dep't 1897). The court's general doctrine was much more conciliatory: "Within
the power granted, the degree of necessity or propriety of the exercise of the power of
abatement rests exclusively with the proper corporate authorities; but in all cases the
power exercised, or attempted to be exercised, must depend upon the nature and extent of the power granted; and whenever the question of the existence or limit of the
power is in question, it becomes the plain duty of the court to see that the corporate
authorities do not transcend the authority delegated to them." Id. at 6, 46 N. Y. Supp.
at 207.

37. Fire Department of New York v. Atlas Steamship Co., io6 N. Y. 566, 13
N. E. 329 (1887). Here the court declared, "The [board of] examiners had jurisdiction of the matter [mode of construction of a building], and their determination
cannot be reviewed by the courts, even if their requirement was unreasonable, so long
as it was not wholly impracticable." Id. at 578, 13 N. E. at 333. Reference may be
made also to Russo v. Miller, 221 Mo. App. 292, 3 S. W. (2d) 266 (1928), where

the court said that "police officers may not be enjoined from the performance
of their proper duties in connection with the exercise of the general police power, and
this is true even though their acts may be performed in an offensive, oppressive, or
unlawful manner," Id. at 298, 2 S.W. (2d) at 268. Italics are the court's.
38. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N. E.
309 (1930).

"When a municipal corporation exercises its police power, the courts

will not interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 91, 172
N. E. at 311. Or, more recently, Appeal of Bell Telephone Co., 138 Pa. Super. 527,
io A. (2d) 817 (I94O), in which the court held itself "limited to a consideration of
errors of law, which means that we may only reverse the order [sustaining the borough government in its demand that the telephone company remove its wires from
part of a street or place them under the street] if the evidence is not sufficient to
suoport the findings of fact or if the conclusions are so unreasonable, capricious, or
arbitrary as to amount to an error of law." Id. at 531, 1o A. (2d) at 8i8-Si.
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whole, it can well be said that "American courts have in the absence of
clear language leaned rather against an administrative power to specify
methods, so long as the required result would be obtained in some
manner." 39 It is, therefore, a perfectly natural consequence that, in
general, municipal authorities have come to prefer a legislative specification of the means to leaving the choice of means to administrative
judgment. This fact must be appreciated in appraising the decision of
the Louisiana court.
Clearly, the municipal council of New Orleans considered it safer
to obviate an attack upon the individual administrative determination
of the means by writing a detailed specification into its ordinance. In
its original form, the ordinance had merely demanded a "proper, suitable and substantial fence not less than seven (7) feet nor more than
ten (io) feet high." That formulation still involved a great deal of
administrative freedom in giving concrete meaning to the fairly broad
phraseology of the legislative prescription. As its inevitable counterpart, there would remain the same amount of freedom of argument
on the part of each junk yard operator affected by the regulation. One
need not search widely in the annals of due process of law to realize
the ambiguity of terms such as "proper, suitable and substantial." 40 By
amending the formula in the interest.of clarity and definiteness, the
city in effect transferred responsibility for the choice of the means
from the police department to the legislative chamber. From now on,
there could no longer be any doubt as to what a "proper, suitable and
substantial fence" might be. Because of the misgivings which courts
so often register concerning administrative power inadequately guided
by legislative direction, 41 the result in itself was certainly not without
its merits. It simultaneously brought into the picture, however, the
demerit of exclusiveness. And the demerit proved legally decisive.
Thus the city found itself neatly placed between two stools. It
had substituted a legislative recipe for an administrative recipe, but it
did not earn judicial gratitude for it. It had sacrificed an elastic clause
for the sake of unequivocal conciseness, only to discover that thereby
it had departed from the narrow path of legality. It had tried to be
"practical", but heard itself berated as "unreasonable". In fact, the
court did not even bother to look into the factors behind the amendment of the ordinance. Yet it.must have been plain that the reformulation of the controversial clause was hardly inspired by mere whim.
In the eyes of the law, however, that seemed to make no difference.
39. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE PovEs oVE PERsoNs AND PRoPERTY (1928)

149.

40. Cf. MoTT, DuE PRocEss OF LAW (1926).
41. Cf. Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of
Discretio (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv..954, 966, 973 et seq.
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It may be of interest to discover whether the same dilemma is
present in other national jurisdictions, more exactly, in those influenced
by the traditions of continental administrative law.42 If it is, has there
been any attempt at evolving a solution? How satisfactory is the solution? Might it help us in meeting our own problem? These are the
questions to concern us now.
II
One way of outlining the approach of continental administrative
law toward the difficulty here indicated is to give a general account of
abstract rules. Another way is to present a picture of these rules in
operation. No doubt a systematic exposition has its value. But the
concrete setting of a representative case usually affords a better perspective. We take our illustration from the official reports of the
Prussian Supreme Administrative Court. 43 In this instance, the controversy portrayed in the Louisiana case did not arise between a private
enterprise and a public authority, but between a local government and
the hierarchy of state agencies charged with the exercise of the police
power. As will be seen, however, the legal situation was not influenced
by the public character of the parties.
The City of H owned a parcel of land located in the rural municipality of M. The lot had been acquired because on it there was a
spring from which the city drew part of its drinking water. Subsequently, the rural municipality decided to operate a quarry on ground
it owned in the vicinity, no more than some 250 yards from the spring
enclosure. Upon the city's remonstrance, the State Minister for Welfare 44 instructed the district prefect 4' to prohibit the operation of the
46
quarry. The latter communicated the decision to the county prefect,
subordinate to him, who in turn informed the rural municipality that
further use of the quarry could not be tolerated because of the danger
to public health in the City of H. While the rural municipality might
have carried the matter before the administrative courts, it took no
steps against the ministerial decision within the period of time fixed
42. For the essential unity of this body of law see Morstein Marx, loc. cit. supra
note IO. Needless to say, we are dealing here with the legal pattern prior to its
destruction by totalitarianism. It would hence be more accurate to put the questions
that follow in the past tense.
43. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 283 (1929).
44. Unlike the normal functions of an American State Department of Welfare, the
Minister was empowered to concern himself with this matter. His authority was not

in doubt.
45. For his area the district prefect exercises the general police power of the state.
On the functions of this officer see WELLS, GERMAN CITIEs (1932) 22, 133-134; Morstein Marx, Germany in LocAL GOviRNMENT IN EUROPE (Anderson ed., 1939) 223, 259.
46. The county is not only a unit of local government, but also a subdivision of
state administration, being in this respect a part of the district area. See note 45
supra. On the functions of the county prefect see WELLS, op. cit. spra note 45, at
23, 134, 185 et seq.; Morstein Marx, loc. cit. supra note 45, at 252, 259.
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by statute for bringing action. Instead, at a later date, it submitted to
the county prefect a request for reconsideration of the question by the
higher authorities. The request was accompanied by an explanatory
memorandum setting forth the municipal interest in utilizing the
quarry; it also contained specific suggestions for measures which the
municipality was willing to take in order to safeguard the purity of the
spring water.
Although the county prefect proved amenable to this proposal, it
was rejected by the district prefect who felt that there was not sufficient
reason for initiating a ministerial reconsideration. He pointed out,
however, that he would assume a different attitude if the rural municipality could secure a change in the advisory opinion prepared for the
Minister for Welfare by the State Institute of Public Hygiene, either
by asking a geologist 'of the Institute to reexamine the site or by
supplying an additional advisory opinion from another, geologist. In
transmitting this reply to the municipal council, the county prefect
added: "I must leave it to your discretion to follow one or the other
alternative. Without such a further exploration, I would not know
how a change of the ministerial decision could be achieved. For the
time being, my earlier communication concerning the prohibition of the
operation of the quarry must remain effective." -1 Now the rural
municipality brought action. It had no success before the lower administrative court, but on appeal the contested decision was annulled.
The Supreme Administrative Court dealt first with the formal
grounds on which the action had been dismissed. The lower court
had declared plaintiff to be barred by laches. The earlier administrative
decision could no longer be attacked because plaintiff's right of action
had expired; and the county prefect's subsequent reference to the earlier
decision was not a new decision opening up a new opportunity of
judicial redress. With this view the appellate court took issue: "In the
case at hand, the facts fail to sustain the inference that nothing more
is involved than the repetition of an administrative act. The Supreme
Administrative Court has consistently adhered in its decisions to the
principle that the party affected by an administrative act creating a
permanent legal condition is entitled at any time to demand the revocation or modification of this act when its factual presuppositions have
in the meantime changed in such a way that the previous danger justifying police measures appears removed." 48 Citing precedents,49 the
court restated the rule as follows: "If a demand of this kind is rejected
47. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 283, 284 (1929).
48. Id. at 284-285.
49. 15 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 413 (887); 29
Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 429 (1896).
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by the police authority, the rejection must be regarded as a new administrative act, which brings into being an independent right of
action." 50 We may note in passing that French administrative justice
has likewise come to recognize an independent right of action against
confirmatory orders whenever the aggrieved citizen was able to point
to a new factor which had not been present originally. 51 Here, as
there, the adjustment in favor of the individual interest affected was
accomplished, not by legislation, but by judicial decision. 52
However, had not the district prefect in his response to the request of the rural municipality plainly intimated that his position was
predicated on the absence of any change in the situation? Had he not
rather hinted at some practical way of working toward such a change?
The Supreme Administrative Court took the opposite position: "The
[earlier] prohibition of the operation of the quarry was issued because
the police authorities were fearful that [in the course of its operation],
and owing to the geological formation of the ground, substances dangerous to public health might penetrate into the water supply system
of the City of H. In its later request, however, the rural municipality
has proposed to remove this danger [by specific arrangements] which
it declared itself explicitly willing to provide. It has repeated this offer
before the court, adding that it would forbid its workers to do anything that might impair the quality of the spring water, and that it
would put up posters prohibiting any trespassing by others. The offer
thus made represents a new circumstance, having an immediate bearing
upon the appraisal of the situation; consequently, the police authorities
were under an obligation to review the situation again, and to issue a
new order on the basis of the implied request for revocation of the
permanent prohibition of the enterprise." " In countering merely with
suggestions for further steps to be taken by plaintiff, the police authorities, notwithstanding their good intentions, had failed to do their duty.
In the elaboration of the court, "Any one affected by an administrative act establishing a permanent state must be regarded as justified
in demanding its revocation not only when the original danger has
ceased to exist on account of a change of factual conditions, but also
when by a method other than that applied in the order the danger can
be removed effectively, provided that he be ready and able to make use
of the other method. If the elimination of the danger is insured, the
purpose underlying the exercise of the police power will be accomplished with equal effectiveness in either case. The police authorities
50. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 283, 285 (929).
51. Cf. HAURIOU, PRtCiS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF Er DE DROIT PuBLIc (12th ed.

1933) 415.
52. Delacour case, 98 Recueil des Arr~ts du Conseil d'Atat 836 (1928).
53. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 283, 285 (1929).
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are not empowered to insist on the means chosen by them for all time
simply because the period during which action was required to be
brought has expired. If they refuse to sanction another means of
meeting the danger, the refusal must be treated as a new administrative
act, itself subject to litigation. The sole controlling consideration in
the exercise of the police power must always be the question whether
or not the objective in eliminating the danger is reached. Hence it is
legally one and the same thing if the new means offered in the face of
an order creating a permanent situation results from scientific or technological progress, or if the aggrieved party suggests a means which
was known to it before but which has occurred to it only afterwards
In
as the fruit of a more thorough analysis of the whole matter."
other words, ignorance or lack of imagination cannot be charged to
the aggrieved party's account. Even if the party comes to court
belatedly, having been slow in finding a less burdensome means, it will
obtain a hearing and may secure a remedy.
On the substantive aspect, the court did not deny the power of the
police authorities to prohibit the operation of the quarry in so far as
that would appear necessary for the protection of public health.5 5 However, "in doing so, they must take into consideration the legal institution of property which carries with it the conceptual implication that
the owner is free on principle to use his property as he sees fit, in particular, to utilize it for economic purposes in accordance with prevailing
standards. On the other hand, this freedom finds its limitation in the
maxim that the doings of the owner may not result in injury to the
public interest. Those charged with the exercise of the police power
must therefore raise the question in each individual case whether or not
property rights are made use of in a manner transcending the bounds
of a social order dedicated to the common welfare." 51 Or, as the
Weimar Constitution of 1919 expressed it, "Property implies duties.
The use to which it is put shall also be of service to the welfare of
obligations of property is one of
all." 57 And the reenforcement of the
58
power.
police
the
of
tasks
the main
54. Id. at 285-286.
55. Without error, the court declared this power to be founded upon general legal
principle, disposing simultaneously of the notion that the Prussian Water Act of April
13, 1913 (GEsErZSAMIMLUNG 53) might offer a supplementary justification, since the
Water Act reserved action only for the private interests adversely affected by unlawful
exercise of property rights. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 283, 286-287 (1929).

56. Id. at 287.
57. Art. 153, f[ 3. Whether this constitutional provision had the character of an
immediately applicable legal rule, or whether it rather addressed itself to the legislative branch as a guide of policy was a matter of debate among the jurists of the
republican period. Cf. ANscThz, DIE VMFASSUNG DES DEUTScHixz REicHs (I4th
ed. 1933) 721.

58. As John Dickinson put it in his argument before the Supreme Court in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co.: "The liberty which our Anglo-Saxon ancestors have fought to
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Applying these propositions, the court held that "the original
measures of the police authorities against plaintiff were wholly within
the law. It is true the utilization of the parcel of land in question as a
quarry undoubtedly falls into the scope of normal use. An enterprise
of this kind, however, leads inevitably to [conditions] which may have
effects upon the purity of the spring water. The earlier statements
prepared by experts in connection with the case n6 w before the court
are agreed on the fact that because of the geological character of the
ground, injurious substances are most likely to impair the quality of
the drinking water, be it at present, be it in the course of further operation. In the circumstances, the operator of the quarry must be held
accountable for encroaching upon the public interest. . . . It accords
with this consequence that § 2o2 of the Water Act '9 . . . enjoins the
owner from putting into the ground any substances that would enter
a subterranean flow of water to the disadvantage of others. In view
of the situation the police authorities were empowered to take steps
against an enterprise which interfered with public safety and order." 00
Indeed, the boundary of rightful use calls for public vigilance.
Nor did the court condemn the original choice of method. "In
the initial phase, even the complete prohibition of the operation was no
inappropriate means for preventing the danger anticipated. Nevertheless, that applied . . . only so long as the entrepreneur did not make
any effort to bring his enterprise in harmony with the generally recognized postulates of public hygiene, and thereby remove the obstacles
which from the viewpoint of public safety stood in the way of a
utilization of his property-a utilization in itself lawful. Plaintiff has
made such an offer, declaring its willingness to provide for [arrangements] to satisfy the requirements of public health. Plaintiff is also
prepared to implement these arrangements by [additional precautions]
and by supervision at the site. If permission were given to carry out
the specified measures, the result in the opinion of this court would be
an elimination, not of every possibility, but of the tangible probability
of ill effects upon the drinking water. Beyond that, the police power
may not be invoked. In the light of public safety, the operation of the
quarry under the described stipulations would represent an orderly form
of property use which the legal system guarantees the owner. As
plaintiff has stated without being contradicted, the quarry has been
fenced off and is no longer accessible to any one but the workers.
maintain for 5o generations has been liberty under law, and law means regulation."
SEN. Doc. No. 197, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 15.
59. See note 55 supra. The court used this illustration only as a suggestive parallel, but not as a basis for the exercise of the police power.
6o. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 283, 287 (1929).
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Should some prowler climb across the fence and cause damage to the
spring, plaintiff could not be looked upon as responsible. Finally,
since the expert opinion of Professor G. suggests that the operation of
the quarry might not only impair the quality of the drinking water but
possibly also lower the capacity of the spring, it must be pointed out
that this contingency is not a matter of public law, and therefore
cannot be considered here." 61 It is familiar doctrine that the police
power may not attempt to substitute for private litigation. 62 The
City of H would be forced to sue if it wished to protect its property
rights.
The court concluded, "For the reasons put forth, the contested
measure, by reaffirming the complete closing of the quarry, went beyond
the scope of what was necessary in the interest of public safety. It
therefore must be rescinded. It will be the task of the county prefect
to advise the rural municipality, on the basis of this decision and in
cooperation with the county physician, as to the safe conduct of operation, and to make certain that the enterprise conforms with the requirements of public health, if necessary, by issuing either an order or an
ordinance. Should the City of H deem it desirable to protect itself
against the conceivable curtailment of its water supply or to prevent
the actual occurrence of the more remote possibilities of an impairment
of the quality of its drinking water, it can avail itself of the opportunity of obtaining the necessary guaranties either through agreement
or [in other ways]." 63 But such marginal interests would not lend
themselves to a defense by the state's police power. It would be
necessary for the city to proceed in its own name and on its own right.
Two factors incidental to our main theme stand out in this decision
with sufficient clarity to warrant a special word of comment. In the
first place, it is worth noting that the Supreme Administrative Court
saw no reason for concerning itself with one interesting feature of the
case, namely, the fact that the"prohibition of the operation of the quarry
rested essentially on ministerial instruction of the state's field authorities. But the court was entirely right in not considering the minister's
61. Id. at

287-288.

62. On the former scope of jurisdiction of the German administrative courts, as
contrasted with that of the "ordinary" judiciary, cf. Uhlman and Rupp, The German
System of Administrative Courts: A Contribution to the Discussion of the Proposed
Federal Administrative Court (1937) 31 ILL. L. REV. 847, 1028. On France (under
the Third Republic) cf. Riesenfeld, The French System of Administrative $itstice: A
Model for American Law? (1938) I8 B. U. L. REv. 48, 400, 715. Cf. also FarAxXri,
T

E

DuAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY Or DicrAToRsHip (1941);

Mor-

stein Marx, loc. cit. supra note lO. On the present status of German administrative
justice cf. Morstein Marx, The Effects of the War on the Government of Germany
in GOVERNMENT IN WARTIME EuopE (Zink and Cole ed., 1941) 74, 79; Morstein
Marx, Book Review (941) 54 HAav.L. REV. 1264.
63. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Obervervaltungsgerichts 283, 288, 289
(1929).
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order, for, as the head of a central department charged with the
protection of public health, he too was bound to observe the limitations
surrounding the exercise of the general police power. His status as a
member of the State Cabinet did not place him in a separate category.
It is altogether probable that he would have been disinclined to alter
his original instruction if the district prefect had submitted to him the
subsequent request of the rural municipality, since that request did not
undertake to disprove the danger to public health. But even if the
Minister for Welfare himself had reaffirmed the prohibition, the legal
consequences would have remained the same. Though largely recruited from the government career service, the life-appointed administrative judiciary was assured of its institutional independence, and
therefore free from hierarchical pressures which might emanate from
the State Cabinet. 4 Minister or prefect, both were required to acknowledge the borderline of law. There could be no sanctity about
ministerial instructions.
On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Administrative
Court demonstrates a considerable amount of sympathetic appreciation
of the administrative situation presented in the case, as contrasted with
the legal questions posed by it. Instead of expounding the law with
divine aloofness from the practical effects flowing from it, the court
felt impelled to offer specific guidance with regard to the further
handling of the issue. The county prefect was urged to render assistance to the rural municipality in meeting the requirements of public
health in the operation of the quarry. He was reminded that the decision did not relieve him of his responsibility as the state's exponent of
the general police power. It would be necessary for him to make a
decision with reference to the necessity of additional safeguards to be
provided under his authority. He would also be required to watch for
any conceivable change of circumstances that might put the matter in
a different light. Such a change of circumstances could conceivably
lead to a complete reappraisal of the danger to public health, and to
that extent make the court decision virtually obsolete. Similar words
of counsel were addressed to the city anxious to preserve the quality
of its drinking water. Thus one may say that the court tried consciously to give adequate emphasis to the interests which shaded into
the case. More than that, it projected its decision into the administrative situation without forcing an undesirable definiteness upon the
parties in litigation. It showed itself aware of the flux of relevant
conditions and predicated its judgment upon it. It did not claim the
last word, binding for all time to come. The administrative insight
64. On this point compare the authorities cited note 62 supra.

POLICE POWER UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

of the bench, typical of continental administrative justice, 65 sharpened
the court's sense of judicial relativity. It saw its task as that of a link
in a longer chain.
Aside from these incidental points, however, the decision introduces a new element into our discussion by exemplifying the so-called
Rule of the Mildest Means. In the exercise of the police power, public
authorities are entitled to commit themselves to any appropriate method,
but they must yield to an alternative equally appropriate, though less
onerous to the aggrieved party, provided the latter proposes such an
alternative. The significance of the second case here reviewed '6 lies
not only in the fact that it gives expression to the Rule of the Mildest
Means, but also in the application of this rule to a factual setting which
in essence had not changed, except for the proposal of a less burdensome method of satisfying the public interest. For the development
of German administrative law, the second aspect was more important,
since it brought with it a measurable expansion of a principle which
had crystallized much earlier. 67 For our purposes, the decision is
instructive primarily as a conspicuous manifestation of the principle
itself. It will be useful to investigate its implications a little more
closely. This we shall attempt to do in the next section.

III
As Hauriou remarks with subtle irony, "Even in the exercise of
the police power, the end does not justify the means." 68 Nevertheless,
the end often dictates the means. On the other hand, no less often
will there be a competition of appropriate means for recognition by
the governmental authority called upon to remove an encroachment
upon the public interest. If the means chosen is appropriate in a legal
sense, it would pass the judicial test on that count alone. Yet one
appropriate means may rest more heavily on the individual affected
than another means also appropriate. Has the individual a legal claim
to the means less onerous? The question is rarely raised in this form
by American courts. Continental administrative law not only keeps
the question in focus but also offers an unequivocal affirmative reply.
One may notice, however, a certain difference in the French and
the German approach-a difference more in nuance than- in content.
The administrative law of Republican France stressed the freedom of
the individual in selecting an appropriate means for the elimination of
65. It will again be sufficient to refer to the authorities cited note 62 szpra.
66. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 283 (1929).
67. Cf. Drews and Lassar, Allgenwines Polizeirecht in 2 VoN BRAucHrrscH,
VERIVALTUNGSGESETZE FOR PREussEN (22d ed. 1932) I, IOI..
68. HAuRiou, op. cit. supra 51, at 550.
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a danger to the public which he had caused through his conduct. It
was the function of the proper authorities to take cognizance of the
danger and to determine its nature. But in their order addressed to
the responsible individual, they would confine themselves to demanding
the removal of the interference, without prescribing a specific means.
In so far as the means chosen by the individual might prove inadequate,
the obnoxious state would continue to exist, making it necessary for
the authorities to press for further steps. On principle, however, the
initiative for selecting the means could not be taken from the individual.69 We may regard this doctrine as an illustration of the broader
conceptions underlying French administrative law, of which Mestre
has justly said that "it appears founded on the prerogative of the
individual." 70
The Rule of the Mildest Means, as evolved in the judicial consolidation of German administrative law, starts with the same premise.
In Jellinek's words, "The prohibition of any excess in the exercise
[of the police power] leads to the important principle that the choice
among several means of equal effectiveness from the official point of
view must be left to the individual affected." 71 Needless to say, the
principle is intertwined with the wider problem of the appropriate
means. As early as 1886, the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court
defined the limits of the police power in a way suggestive of the Rule of
the Mildest Means. A retail store in a rural community had sold and
offered for consumption on the premises liquor and beer without the
required permit. After the owner had been convicted several times,
the police authority informed him that in case of any further violation
the store would be closed. The court quashed the order, referring the
72
police authority to stricter -vigilance as the proper means.
In a similar case, plaintiff intended to enclose his property adjoining a public road with a fence. Some of the fence posts had been
set into ground until then used by pedestrians as part of the road,
though actually belonging to plaintiff's property. Because after dark
people unaware of the construction were in danger of colliding with
the posts, the police authority ordered the posts to be removed. Rescinding the order, the court said, "The police measures must aipi at
the elimination of dangers arising from the construction of an enclosure which in itself does not conflict with the law; they may not go
69. Vial case, 79 Receuil des Arrts du conseil d'etat 30 (igog); cf. also
HAURIoU, op. cit. mtpra note 5I at 552-553; Note (9o9) 3 SnIY 113.
70. MESTRa, I Limiti del Sindicato Contenaioso nel Riguardi degli Atti dell'Autorit
Ammiistrativa in 2 STUDr Di DniRTro PUBBLICO IN ONoRE Di ORESTit RAELL.ETrI
(1931) 133, 142.
71. JELLINEK, VERWALTUNGSRECHT (2d ed. 1929) 423.
72. 13 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 424, 426 (1886).
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so far as to prohibit the construction." 73 Instead of demanding the
removal of the fence posts, defendant should have insisted on adequate
lighting of the site by the owner.
In sharpening the official conscience, the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court has repeatedly exhorted police authorities to refrain
from "shooting sparrows with cannon balls." 74 When setting aside
a restriction imposed without a time limit although a temporary restriction would have achieved the end, the court declared, "The police
agency, in meeting a danger, prevention of which was within its power
and even its duty, has resorted to a means which exceeds the scope of
what was necessary." 75 In the same vein, judicial sanction was withheld from the prohibition of the public playing of a tune to which
some people had come to sing a politically offensive text.76 The correct
alternative would have been to turn against those singing the insulting
version. Other decisions, still more germane for our topic, underscored the proposition that the police power should not strike like
lightning, but fit itself rationally into the complex processes of modem
society, especially economic relationships. Before the police power be
exercised, the public authorities would be required to familiarize themselves thoroughly with the situation which called for readjustment in
the common interest.
In one case, for example, plaintiff had been ordered to lower the
water level of a dammed-up reservoir which he used for industrial
purposes. The measure was to make possible a cleaning of the brook
bed below. However, "according to the contents of its official files
placed before the court, the police agency has done nothing to give due
consideration, as far as possible, to those of plaintiff's interests here
involved. It has failed to get in touch with him prior to issuing its
order, nor has it in this matter communicated with him at any time." 77
In the circumstances, the order could not be upheld. In another case,
the court enunciated identical standards in an even more exacting
formulation: "The police agency was under an obligation to examine
and determine the extent of the restriction required for the elimination
of the danger to public health. It was required to consider objectively
plaintiff's special industrial interests in the light of the interests of
the public. In order to achieve an accommodation of the two conflicting interests-both entrusted to its proper care . . . it was neces-

404.

73. Id. at 426, 428.
74. FLEimER, INSTITUTIONEN DES DEtTscHEN VERWALTUNGSRECHTS (8th ed.

1928)

75. 75 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts 339, 343 (192o).
The same conclusion is reached in 78 id. at 267, 27o (1923).
76. 80 id. at 176, 191 0925).
77. 51 id. at 284, 289 (1907).
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sary for it to inquire into these interests before issuing its order."

78

Of course, once the duty oF conscientious exploration of all the facts
influencing the administrative act is legally acknowledged, the Rule of
the Mildest Means need not await formal remonstrance on the part of
the aggrieved individual.
Moreover, the legal interest which qualifies him to raise the demand for the least burdensome means need not rest on ownership.
Thus, in one case, the police authority required the removal of a shacklike building because it had been found unfit for dwelling purposes.
Only one person lived in it. The owner was willing to comply with
the order, but the single tenant objected. Bringing action, he declared
himself prepared to carry out all changes and repairs necessary in
order that the building conform with legal standards. The court sided
with him. It held that a building which can be made inhabitable by
modifications of its structure may not be ordered torn down if a serious
offer is made to eliminate the existing danger to the occupants. In
this matter, the tenant would be able to proceed of his own right.
Consent to the demolition on the part of the landlord could not impair
the right of the tenant. The only legitimate concern of the police
authority was with an effective method of barring the danger. It was
not empowered to specify a method more disadvantageous to the tenant
79
than the equally appropriate one proposed by him.
On the other hand, in specifying such a method, the individual
was not limited to the choice of a means which objectively appeared
milder as compared with that originally chosen by the public authority.
He was free to base his selection on an evaluation of his interest as a
whole, independent of the factors which properly entered into the
exercise of the police power. If a building, for example, proved unsafe
for habitation so that extensive repairs were unavoidable, the landlord
was entitled to make a decision with regard to the desirability of
maintaining an unprofitable investment. Should he prefer to rid
himself of it by having the building torn down, he was not blocked
from proposing, as an alternative to carrying out the repairs, the complete eradication of the structure, although this would normally be the
more far-reaching means of removing the danger. If the tenants
failed to come forth with a counterproposal for financing the repairs
jointly, the police authority would be forced to accept the landlord's
method, leaving it to him to settle his legal accounts with the tenants.8 0
The court's reasoning in coping with this issue deserves fuller
quotation: "In removing a state injurious to the public interest, it is
78. Id. at 313, 314-315.
at 464 (1922).
79. 77 id.
80. 78 id. at 431 (923).

POLICE POWER UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

an established legal rule that the police authority, should there be
several means of eliminating the danger, must choose among those
promising sufficient effectiveness the one which is least onerous to the
individual affected. Which of the several means weighs least heavily
on him is a question of fact, indeed, a question of a subjective character. In any event, the method which the individual concerned is
himself ready to select should be deemed equivalent to another conceivable method, at least from a subjective point of view, so long as it
is suitable objectively for the removal of the danger. Among equivalent
means, however, the individual responsible for the injurious state must
retain free choice. It is not permissible that the police authority under
such conditions prescribes the application of only one method, and at
that the method which he himself considers the more burdensome. In
eliminating a state of danger resulting from the dilapidated condition
of a building occupied for dwelling purposes, the appropriate means,
aside from a restoration of the building, may be either the evacuation
of the endangered apartments, if not the whole house, or the complete
demolition of the structure. Consequently, the police authority had
the duty, in order to meet the danger emanating from the defective
chimneys, to concede plaintiff the choice between the repair of the
chimneys, which was the preference of the police authority, and tearing
down the building, which plaintiff preferred to do." 81
Here, as so often occurs in the determination of the appropriate
means, the method specified by the public authority was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable in a technical sense. In fact, the official preference was supported by persuasive considerations. The housing agency,
eager to preserve the available dwelling space at a time of acute shortage, had naturally favored repairs. It had successfully impressed its
view upon the police authority. From the vantage point of the housing
agency, both evacuation and demolition were distinctly at variance
with the public interest entrusted to it. Yet the housing law encompassed no special power under which a landlord might be compelled
to abstain from tearing down a residential building. In the absence
of such special power, however, the public interest closest to the housing
agency could not validly be projected into the exercise of the general
police power. Being unrestricted by law in the alternatives of his own
decision, the individual affected remained the master of his choice.
There was nothing improper in the housing agency's indication of its
official interest in the matter, but recognition of this interest could be
police
granted only within the canons governing the exercise of the
82
power, and the Rule of the Mildest Means was one of them.
8i. Id. at 433-434.
82. Id. at 434 et seq.
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Having traced some of the more important implications of the
Rule of the Mildest Means, we may suggest a few general conclusions
in the remaining pages. That will involve to a certain extent a return
to our point of departure.
IV
The great body of continental administrative law has not been the
product of systematic legislation, but of judicial inventiveness and.
adjustment. It originated as judge-made concepts and solidified around
precedents. 83 In its character and its organic growth, it offers an
interesting parallel to the evolution of our Anglo-American common
law. Yet it reflected a difference both in-spirit and orientation. That
difference was the immediate result of the channels of communication
between administrative justice and administrative practice. True
enough, administrative courts were far from being mere appendages
of the executive power. Their independence was guarded by institutional autonomy. But on the bench one found experienced administrators who were equally well groomed for the law. , Their intellectual
freedom was buttressed by guaranties of status. In the exercise of
this freedom, however, they were able to rely on their intimate
familiarity with the administrative process. At the same time, they
remained conscious of the fundamental task of administrative justice,
which is "judicial protection against administrative power." 84
The Rule of the Mildest Means is an illustration of the tendencies
that permeated continental administrative law. Its recognition emanated from the inner validity of its practical justification. It achieved
definitive form in a series of judicial decisions, with the Prussian
Supreme Administrative Court in the leading role and the highest
administrative courts of the other German states in that of the supporting cast. In fact, even the "basic concept of the scope and limitations of the police power was not contained in the written law" 8 -- in
sharp contrast to the continental tradition of codification dominating
other legal spheres. For Prussia, the sole foundation of the police
power as elaborated by the Supreme Administrative Court was a single
clause, broad in formulation, embodied in the General Code of 1794.6
Only in 1931 did the legislative branch embark upon a formal
enactment of the principles controlling the exercise of the police
power. 87 Section 41 restated the Rule of the Mildest Means as fol83. For a fuller discussion compare the authorities cited note 62 supra.
84. I RuCm, SCHWEIZERISCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (2d ed. 1939) 157.
85. Drews and Lassar, Allgetnenes Polizeirecht in 2 Vow BRAUCHiTSCE, op. cit.
supra note 67, at I.
- 86. Section io, pt. II, tit. 17.
87. Prussian Police Administration Act of June i, 1931, GESErZSAMN:LUNG (1931)
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lows: "(i) Police orders, unless they are based on a police ordinance
or a special statute, are valid only in so far as they are required for the
removal of a disturbance of public safety or order, or for the elimination of a danger to public safety or order arising from a concrete situation. (2) If several means are available for the removal of a disturbance of public safety or order, or for the effective elimination of a
danger [in the above sense], determination of one of these means by
the police authority suffices. As far as possible, the means least burdensome to the individual affected and to the public must be chosen.
At his request, the individual affected must be permitted to use another
means of his own choice, provided the danger can be eliminated
through it equally effectively. Rejection of his request is to be considered a new police order." The legislature had ratified the improvisations of administrative justice.
Since the statutory provision refrains from stipulating any specific
time at which the request for a less onerous method must be presented
to the police authority, it upholds the judicial rule laid down by the
Supreme Administrative Court in the second case. 88 As an authoritative commentary puts it, "If the individual confronted with an offi-

cially designated means seriously offers another means equally effective
but for him more convenient, it is the duty of the police authority to
choose this means should it be proposed before the order is issued, and
to change the order should the offer occur afterwards. It is necessary,
however, that the offer is not only possible, but is also actually made." 80
The burden of its execution, of course, falls on the individual. But
the police authority is neither 'compelled nor entitled to assume that
there will be a satisfactory execution. The final test for the adequacy
of the means proposed is the elimination of the interference with the
common interest. Should the means fall short of this expectation,
further steps must be demanded. To that extent is the individual's
free choice of an alternative at his own risk. He cannot be heard with
the argument that, after all, he has "done something" to satisfy the
requirements of the public order.9 0
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Rule of the Mildest
Means lies in its capacity for automatic operation, so to speak; that is
to say, it relieves the legislative branch of the difficult, if not impossible, task of specifying the method for the accomplishment of a policy
88. 85 Entscheidungen des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts
See p. 276 supra.
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(1929).

89. Drews and Lassar, Allgenzeiws Polizeirechtin 2 VoN BaAulrCiTSC, o,6. dt.
supra note 67 at 1oi.
go. It is worth recalling that these considerations did find recognition in Morford
v. Board of Health of Asbury Park, 61 N. J. L. 386, 39 Atl. 7o6 (1897). See p. 273
(ig3g). See p. 268 supra.
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purpose, without encouraging simultaneously an uncontrolled discretion
for administrative determination of the method. Even the absence of
any legislative suggestion as to the means to be applied cannot result
in administrative "despotism", for it is peculiar to the rule that it is
ubiquitous and inherent in the very character of the police power. Its
rational foundation must be seen in the axiom basic to constitutional
government that in the face of individual right, the administrative
command can force subordination only in the name of public necessity.
This necessity is not simply to be imputed into an act which issues
from governmental authority. The necessity must be demonstrable in
terms of facts and reasons. It follows that the compulsion of necessity
may not widen its span as a result of the method chosen for the restoration of a state of law. The means is here the servant of the end. It is
not entitled to exactions for its own sake. 91
As the Rule of the Mildest Means relieves the legislature, so does
it also serve to shorten the court docket. In referring the police power
to the need for inquiry into the interests affected by its exercise, the
rule tends to minimize the frequency of litigation. Conference procedure has proved its benefits in crucial areas of government regulation.92 When the public interest conflicts with that of the individual,
it appears sensible to provide the individual with a chance of pondering
the infringement of the legal order which he has caused, and to give him
an opportunity for assuming a share in designing a method which
would remedy the situation. Power thus cloaks itself with the symbols
of consent. In doing so, it gains a deeper authority and secures more
genuine deference. There is less likelihood of quarrel when alternatives
are sought out and thought through with an eye to their effectiveness.
"The most stringent means can only be the last resort." 9s Since the
individual has good reason for avoiding it, he is likely to exert himself
more strongly in giving effect to a method that calls for less.
The Rule of the Mildest Means transfers the immediate responsibility for public safety and order from the legislative body to the
administrative agency. This accords entirely with the inner logic of
our problem. A purely legislative solution is impossible of attainment.
If the legislative formula were specific, it would be too narrow and
too inflexible to attain its purpose. The first case 9' made that painfully evident. If, on the other hand, the legislative prescription were
91. For a good discussion of this point on the basis of German administrative law
cf.

JELLINEK,

GESETz,

GESETZESANWENDUNG

UND

ZWECKMASSIGKEITSERWAGUNG

(1913).
FEDERAL ADI~NSTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (94)
54 et seq.
93. FLEiNER, op. cit. stpra note 74 at 404.
94. City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895, 192 So. 523
(1939). See p. 268 supra.
92. GELLHioRN,
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general and noncommittal with regard to the detail, as it normally is,
it would fail to offer any tangible check upon administrative exuberance
and irrationality. It is plain, then, that the issue by its very nature
gravitates toward the level of policy enforcement rather than that of
policy making. The Rule of the Mildest Means provides an implicit
standard for the operation of the police power on the administrative
plane. It looks toward the individual case. It calls for a weighing
of those interests which overshadow each given dispute. It affords a
yardstick for adjusting, concrete situations. Its superiority over general criteria springs from its character as an individualizing device.
American courts, on the whole, have been prone to press upon
the conduct of administrative business formal, if not formalistic, conceptions which have created more confusion and bewilderment than
certainty and predictability. 95 Yet it is also true that this predisposition was inspired, at least in part, by the slow and incomplete emergence
of implicit standards of administrative legality.9 6 Perhaps it is not
an extravagant assumption that judicial review will take a more constructive turn as these implicit standards are increasingly observed in
the practical work of government agencies. In such a perspective,
the Rule of the Mildest Means may prove deserving of further thought.
95. Cf. Hart, ruidicial Review of Administrative Action: A Thesis (ig4i) 9 GEG.
WASH. L. REV. 499.

96. Cf. Morstein Marx, Comparative Administrative Law: A Note on Review of
Discretion (939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 954.

